new articles
This commit is contained in:
samantha42
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ func Portfolio(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/portfolio.html")
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http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/portfolio.html")
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}
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}
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func Infra(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/infra.html") }
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func Infra(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/infra.html") }
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func Finance(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/finance.html") }
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func Cinema(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/cinema.html") }
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func Cyber(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/cyber.html") }
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func Cyber(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/cyber.html") }
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func About(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/about.html") }
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func About(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/about.html") }
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func GitPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/gitpage.html") }
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func GitPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.ServeFile(w, r, "./static/gitpage.html") }
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@@ -99,6 +101,8 @@ func main() {
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http.HandleFunc("/", About)
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http.HandleFunc("/", About)
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//http.HandleFunc("/portfolio", Portfolio)
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//http.HandleFunc("/portfolio", Portfolio)
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http.HandleFunc("/infra", Infra)
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http.HandleFunc("/infra", Infra)
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http.HandleFunc("/finance", Finance)
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http.HandleFunc("/cinema", Cinema)
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http.HandleFunc("/cyber", Cyber)
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http.HandleFunc("/cyber", Cyber)
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//http.HandleFunc("/gitpage", GitPage)
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//http.HandleFunc("/gitpage", GitPage)
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//http.HandleFunc("/gitpage/TicTacToe", GitPageTicTacToe)
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//http.HandleFunc("/gitpage/TicTacToe", GitPageTicTacToe)
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@@ -20,8 +20,11 @@
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<br /><span><p class="section-label">//Opinion</p></span>
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<br /><span><p class="section-label">//Opinion</p></span>
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<a href="/cinema"><span>Cinema</span></a>
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<a href="/finance"><span>Finance</span></a>
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<a href="/cyber"><span>cyber</span></a>
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<a href="/cyber"><span>cyber</span></a>
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<a href="/infra"><span>infra</span></a>
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<a href="/infra"><span>infra</span></a>
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</nav>
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</nav>
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<header>
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<header>
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@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
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<!doctype html>
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<html lang="en">
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<head>
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<meta charset="UTF-8" />
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<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
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<title>The Industry That Ate Itself - Samantha Vero Friis</title>
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<link
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href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=DM+Mono:wght@300;400;500&family=Syne:wght@400;700;800&display=swap"
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rel="stylesheet"
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/>
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<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />
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</head>
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<body>
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<div class="container--narrow">
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<header>
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<a href="/" class="back">← back</a>
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<p class="tag">// opinion</p>
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<h1>The Industry<br />That Ate<br /><span>Itself</span></h1>
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<div class="byline">
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<span>Samantha Vero Friis</span>
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<span>—</span>
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<span>Film & Media</span>
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</div>
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</header>
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<article>
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<p class="lead">
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Cinema is not dying because audiences stopped caring about
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film. It is dying because the people running it stopped
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making decisions that could produce anything worth caring
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about. That is a business problem, not a cultural one - and
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it has a clear and traceable cause.
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</p>
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<h2>How You Optimize a Creative Industry to Death</h2>
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<p>
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Every major studio is ultimately answerable to capital. That
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is not unusual - most industries are. What is unusual about
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film is that capital and creative quality are in unusually
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direct tension. A film that takes a genuine risk might return
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ten times its budget or nothing. A sequel to an established
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property will almost certainly return two or three times its
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budget, reliably, with predictable variance. For a public
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company managing quarterly earnings, the choice is not
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difficult. You make the sequel.
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</p>
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<p>
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The problem is that this logic, applied consistently across
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an entire industry over twenty years, does not produce a
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stable business. It produces a slow erosion of the thing
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that made the business worth having in the first place.
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Audiences do not go to cinemas to see sequels to sequels.
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They go because occasionally something extraordinary happens
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on a screen and they want to be in the room when it does.
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Strip out the extraordinary, and you have stripped out the
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reason to show up.
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</p>
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<h2>The Franchise as a Business Model</h2>
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<p>
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The Matrix is a precise case study because the original
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trilogy was, by design, a complete thing. Three films with
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a beginning, a middle, and an ending. The story resolved.
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The characters finished where they were going. Whatever
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criticisms one might make of Reloaded or Revolutions, the
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trilogy had the structural integrity of something that knew
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it was going to end. That is increasingly rare, and it
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matters - because an ending is what separates a story from
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a content pipeline.
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</p>
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<p>
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The correct response to owning the Matrix IP after the
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trilogy was either to leave it alone or to build something
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genuinely new inside the same universe. The world the
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Wachowskis constructed is large enough. New characters, a
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different era, a different corner of the machine war, a
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different question about the nature of the simulation - any
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of these could have been the basis for something that
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respected the original while standing on its own. A current
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audience does not need Neo. It needs a new conflict with
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real stakes and a story it has not already seen.
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</p>
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<p>
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What Warner Bros. produced instead was The Matrix
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Resurrections in 2021 - eighteen years after the trilogy
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ended - with the same lead actors, the same Agent Smith,
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and a plot that literally resurrects the characters the
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previous films had concluded. The decision to bring back
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the same faces was not a creative one. It was a calculation
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that name recognition and nostalgia would lower the
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perceived risk of the investment. The studio did not believe
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in the universe. It believed in the brand. The audience
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noticed. The film failed - not because the Matrix concept
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is exhausted, but because the film offered nothing except
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proof that the people making it were not willing to find
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out whether it could work without a safety net.
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</p>
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<p>
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Star Wars industrialised this dynamic at a scale that was
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previously unimaginable. The acquisition of Lucasfilm was
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not a creative decision - it was a content library acquisition.
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What followed was the systematic conversion of a mythology
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that had genuine cultural weight into a production pipeline.
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Films, series, spin-offs, prequels, sequels, all released
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on a cadence driven by release windows and subscriber targets
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rather than by whether anyone had something worth saying.
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The audience eventually signalled, clearly, that it was
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exhausted. The response was not to slow down - it was to
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try different combinations of the same components.
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</p>
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<blockquote>
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A franchise is not a creative decision.<br />
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It is a <span>risk management strategy</span> dressed as one.
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</blockquote>
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<h2>Marvel and the Pipeline Fallacy</h2>
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<p>
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The Marvel Cinematic Universe is the most important case
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study in modern film economics because it succeeded
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spectacularly for long enough that the people running it
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drew the wrong conclusion from their own success. From Iron
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Man in 2008 through to Endgame in 2019, the MCU produced
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something genuinely unusual: a connected series of films
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that were, individually, mostly good, and collectively
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something audiences had never experienced before. The
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shared universe worked. Characters crossed over. Threads
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built across years. When it paid off, it paid off at a
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scale that reshaped the entire industry's assumptions about
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what a film could be.
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</p>
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<p>
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The mistake was in identifying why it worked. The shared
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universe was not the product. It was the reward for the
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product. Audiences invested in the connections between
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films because the films themselves had earned that
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investment. Iron Man was a good film. The Winter Soldier
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was a good film. Guardians of the Galaxy was a good film.
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Each one worked as a standalone experience, which meant
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that when they intersected, the intersection meant
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something. The connective tissue had weight because the
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individual pieces had weight.
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</p>
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<p>
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What Marvel - and Disney, which had acquired it - took
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from this was a different lesson: that the pipeline itself
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was the asset. That releasing four films and multiple
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Disney+ series per year, all tagged as MCU content, would
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sustain audience engagement indefinitely because the brand
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had accumulated enough goodwill to carry anything attached
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to it. This is a category error. Goodwill is not a
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renewable resource. It is the residue of past quality,
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and it depletes every time it is spent on something that
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does not deserve it.
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</p>
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<p>
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The post-Endgame MCU inherited an audience that had spent
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eleven years being rewarded for paying attention. What it
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offered in return was volume. Films that were
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competently assembled but existed primarily to move pieces
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into position for the next film. Disney+ series that were
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mandatory viewing if you wanted to understand the cinema
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releases, effectively converting a leisure choice into
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homework. Characters introduced and abandoned. Storylines
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launched and quietly dropped. The shared universe, which
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had once been the payoff for engagement, became the reason
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engagement was required just to follow along. The audience
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began to disengage - not because superhero films stopped
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being possible, but because the implicit contract had been
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broken. The pipeline had forgotten that it was dependent
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on the films being good, not merely connected.
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</p>
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<p>
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Streaming did not fix this dynamic. It accelerated it and
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added a new and more corrosive incentive on top: subscriber
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acquisition. A studio making theatrical films needs a film
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to be good enough that people will pay to see it. A streaming
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platform needs content to exist in sufficient volume and
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variety that enough different people will start a subscription
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and not cancel it. These are genuinely different problems,
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and the second one does not require quality - it requires
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surface area.
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</p>
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<p>
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Altered Carbon is a personal example of what this looks
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like from the other side. The first season was genuinely
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good - ambitious production design, a coherent adaptation
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of its source material, the kind of science fiction that
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takes its own premise seriously. I liked it. I kept
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watching. I was exactly the subscriber Netflix should want
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to retain. The show was cancelled after two seasons
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regardless, and I eventually cancelled the subscription.
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Those two facts are more connected than they might appear.
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</p>
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<p>
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The issue is not that Netflix made a bad decision by its
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own logic. The issue is what its logic measures. A
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subscriber who genuinely loves three or four ambitious
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series and watches them carefully registers identically to
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a subscriber who half-watches twenty shows and never
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finishes any of them - as long as both keep paying. The
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metric that matters is new sign-ups, because that is what
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the market rewards. Retention of engaged viewers who care
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about specific content is a secondary concern at best.
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Cancelling Altered Carbon did not cost Netflix the number
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it was optimizing for. It cost them me - eventually - and
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I was never the unit being counted.
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</p>
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<p>
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What this produces is a library optimized not for quality
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or loyalty but for the minimum threshold of good enough to
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keep someone paying while the next acquisition drives new
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sign-ups. The service does not need you to love it. It
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needs you to not quite hate it enough to cancel. That is a
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meaningful distinction. A library built around that
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incentive looks very different from one built around making
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things worth watching - and over time, the difference
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becomes visible.
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</p>
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<div class="table-wrap">
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<table class="attack-table">
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<thead>
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<tr>
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<th>Model</th>
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<th>Primary incentive</th>
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<th>What it produces</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>Theatrical studio</td>
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<td>
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Maximise opening weekend and franchise
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extension potential
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</td>
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<td class="counter">
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IP acquisitions, sequels, safe casting,
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risk-averse greenlight decisions
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</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Streaming platform</td>
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<td>
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Subscriber acquisition and retention
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across the broadest possible audience
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</td>
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<td class="counter">
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High volume, uneven quality, early
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cancellations, content churn
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</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Franchise extension</td>
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<td>
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Extract value from an established
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property at minimal creative cost
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</td>
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<td class="counter">
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Diminishing quality per instalment,
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audience fatigue, brand erosion
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</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>AI-assisted production</td>
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<td>
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Reduce per-unit content cost to near
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zero while maintaining surface coverage
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</td>
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<td class="counter">
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Structural collapse of the floor —
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unlimited slop at no marginal cost
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</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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</div>
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<h2>AI Is Where This Was Always Going</h2>
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<p>
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The question AI puts to the industry is not a technical
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one. It is a choice: do we hire a writer, or don't we?
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Do we commission a director with a specific vision, or do
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we generate the output that vision would have produced?
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That choice is now explicit in a way it was not before.
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And given everything the industry has already demonstrated
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about its priorities - the franchise logic, the subscriber
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metrics, the systematic elimination of creative risk —
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there is not much reason to expect most studios and
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platforms to choose the human when the alternative is
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cheaper and more controllable.
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</p>
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<p>
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This is what artists have been worried about, and they are
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right - but not quite for the reason usually given. The
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concern is often framed as AI producing bad films. The more
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accurate concern is that AI produces films optimised for
|
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the same thing the industry already optimises for: volume,
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familiarity, minimum acceptable quality. AI does not
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introduce a new set of values into the pipeline. It
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enforces the existing ones more efficiently. A model
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trained on what has performed before will reliably produce
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more of what has performed before. For an industry that has
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spent two decades treating proven formula as the safest
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|
bet, that is not a warning. It is a feature.
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|
</p>
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<p>
|
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What gets lost is not quality in the narrow sense - an
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AI can produce something watchable, and watchable is
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already the threshold most of the industry is aiming for.
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|
What gets lost is the possibility of something genuinely
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unexpected. A writer or director brings a specific
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|
perspective that did not exist before, that cannot be
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|
interpolated from what came before, and that occasionally
|
||||||
|
produces something the market did not know it wanted until
|
||||||
|
it arrived. The first Matrix was that. The early MCU was
|
||||||
|
that. The pipeline, fully enforced by AI, eliminates the
|
||||||
|
conditions under which that becomes possible. Every film
|
||||||
|
becomes a variation on the centroid of everything that
|
||||||
|
already worked. The ceiling does not disappear - it just
|
||||||
|
gets permanent.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<h2>What Would Fix It</h2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
The honest answer is that the incentive structure would
|
||||||
|
need to change, and there is no obvious mechanism by which
|
||||||
|
that happens from inside the industry. The studios that
|
||||||
|
consistently produce the best work are either small enough
|
||||||
|
to be insulated from franchise logic, backed by individuals
|
||||||
|
with enough capital and conviction to override short-term
|
||||||
|
return calculations, or operating in markets where the
|
||||||
|
economics of Hollywood do not apply in the same way.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Audiences have some leverage. Theatrical attendance is a
|
||||||
|
direct signal. Not watching a streaming series past its
|
||||||
|
first episode is a direct signal. The platforms and studios
|
||||||
|
read these signals carefully - they just tend to read them
|
||||||
|
as evidence that they need better marketing rather than
|
||||||
|
better films. That misreading is itself a symptom of an
|
||||||
|
industry that has fully internalised the idea that the
|
||||||
|
product is secondary to the pipeline.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<hr />
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Cinema at its best is one of the few experiences that cannot
|
||||||
|
be fully replicated on a phone screen with half your
|
||||||
|
attention elsewhere. The industry has spent twenty years
|
||||||
|
making content that can be. That is not an accident. It is
|
||||||
|
what you get when every structural incentive points toward
|
||||||
|
volume, safety, and extraction - and nobody in a position
|
||||||
|
to change it has a strong enough reason to try.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
</article>
|
||||||
|
<footer>
|
||||||
|
<a href="mailto:contact@samantha42.xyz">contact@samantha42.xyz</a>
|
||||||
|
<p>© 2026 — All rights reserved</p>
|
||||||
|
</footer>
|
||||||
|
</div>
|
||||||
|
</body>
|
||||||
|
</html>
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
|
|||||||
|
<!doctype html>
|
||||||
|
<html lang="en">
|
||||||
|
<head>
|
||||||
|
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
|
||||||
|
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
|
||||||
|
<title>Consensus Is the Problem — Samantha Vero Friis</title>
|
||||||
|
<link
|
||||||
|
href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=DM+Mono:wght@300;400;500&family=Syne:wght@400;700;800&display=swap"
|
||||||
|
rel="stylesheet"
|
||||||
|
/>
|
||||||
|
<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />
|
||||||
|
</head>
|
||||||
|
<body>
|
||||||
|
<div class="container--narrow">
|
||||||
|
<header>
|
||||||
|
<a href="/" class="back">← back</a>
|
||||||
|
<p class="tag">// opinion</p>
|
||||||
|
<h1>Consensus Is<br />the<br /><span>Problem</span></h1>
|
||||||
|
<div class="byline">
|
||||||
|
<span>Samantha Vero Friis</span>
|
||||||
|
<span>—</span>
|
||||||
|
<span>Finance & Investing</span>
|
||||||
|
</div>
|
||||||
|
</header>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<article>
|
||||||
|
<p class="lead">
|
||||||
|
A stock price is not a summary of a company's fundamentals.
|
||||||
|
It is the market's current best guess about the future.
|
||||||
|
The price already contains expectations. The question worth
|
||||||
|
asking is whether those expectations are right.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<h2>What a Price Is Really Saying</h2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Every valuation implies a story. A company trading at forty
|
||||||
|
times earnings is not just expensive — it is telling you that
|
||||||
|
the market believes something specific: that growth will remain
|
||||||
|
high for long enough, that margins will hold, that the
|
||||||
|
competitive position is durable. Unpack the multiple into its
|
||||||
|
components and you have a set of forecasts baked into the
|
||||||
|
price. The investor's job is to decide whether those forecasts
|
||||||
|
are reasonable.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
This reframing matters because it shifts the question from
|
||||||
|
"is this stock cheap?" to "is this story credible?" Cheap
|
||||||
|
stocks can be cheap for good reason. Expensive stocks can be
|
||||||
|
undervalued if the embedded assumptions are too conservative.
|
||||||
|
Value, in this sense, is not a property of price alone — it
|
||||||
|
is the gap between what the price implies and what reality is
|
||||||
|
likely to deliver.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<h2>The Consensus Problem</h2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Markets aggregate information quickly and, on average, do it
|
||||||
|
well. But consensus is not the same as correctness. Consensus
|
||||||
|
is the average of what a large number of participants currently
|
||||||
|
believe, weighted by their capital. It reflects what is known,
|
||||||
|
what is legible, and what is socially acceptable to believe.
|
||||||
|
It is systematically slow to update on things that are
|
||||||
|
ambiguous, uncomfortable, or genuinely novel.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
When an investment thesis is consensus — when every analyst
|
||||||
|
covers the stock, every major fund holds it, and the positive
|
||||||
|
narrative is repeated on every earnings call — the upside is
|
||||||
|
already in the price. There is no one left to convince. A
|
||||||
|
buyer who enters at that point is not getting paid for a
|
||||||
|
correct view. They are paying for the privilege of agreeing
|
||||||
|
with everyone else.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<blockquote>
|
||||||
|
The consensus trade is <span>already priced</span>.<br />
|
||||||
|
Only disagreement can <span>generate alpha</span>.
|
||||||
|
</blockquote>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
This is the central problem with conventional value investing
|
||||||
|
as it is commonly practiced today. The stocks that look most
|
||||||
|
obviously cheap are often the ones where the consensus has
|
||||||
|
already decided they deserve to be cheap. The screening
|
||||||
|
criteria that identify "value" are, by construction, widely
|
||||||
|
known and widely applied. The edge that came from running
|
||||||
|
those screens in 1975 does not exist in the same form now.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<h2>Where Mispricing Actually Lives</h2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Genuine mispricing tends to occur in situations where the
|
||||||
|
consensus view is wrong in a specific and identifiable way,
|
||||||
|
and where that wrongness has not yet been corrected. This
|
||||||
|
can happen for several structural reasons.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Institutional constraints create systematic blind spots. Fund
|
||||||
|
managers are evaluated on short cycles, penalized for holding
|
||||||
|
unfashionable names, and often prohibited from owning
|
||||||
|
securities outside their mandate. These pressures push capital
|
||||||
|
away from certain situations not because the economics are bad
|
||||||
|
but because the social and career costs of being wrong there
|
||||||
|
are high. The result is that some assets are systematically
|
||||||
|
underowned relative to their intrinsic value.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Narrative lag is another source. Companies undergoing genuine
|
||||||
|
change — a new management team, a shift in cost structure, an
|
||||||
|
improving competitive position — often continue to be priced
|
||||||
|
against their old story long after the underlying reality has
|
||||||
|
shifted. The market is very good at updating on quantitative
|
||||||
|
signals and very slow at updating on qualitative ones.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Complexity discounts are real and often excessive. A business
|
||||||
|
that is hard to model, that operates across multiple segments,
|
||||||
|
or that sits at the intersection of industries analysts do not
|
||||||
|
cover together will often trade at a lower multiple than a
|
||||||
|
simpler business with identical economics. That discount is not
|
||||||
|
always irrational — complexity carries risk — but it is often
|
||||||
|
overdone.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<div class="table-wrap">
|
||||||
|
<table class="attack-table">
|
||||||
|
<thead>
|
||||||
|
<tr>
|
||||||
|
<th>Source</th>
|
||||||
|
<th>Why consensus gets it wrong</th>
|
||||||
|
<th>What to look for</th>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
</thead>
|
||||||
|
<tbody>
|
||||||
|
<tr>
|
||||||
|
<td>Institutional constraints</td>
|
||||||
|
<td>
|
||||||
|
Capital avoids the name for structural,
|
||||||
|
not economic, reasons
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
<td class="counter">
|
||||||
|
Forced sellers, mandate mismatches,
|
||||||
|
index exclusions
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr>
|
||||||
|
<td>Narrative lag</td>
|
||||||
|
<td>
|
||||||
|
Price reflects the old story; reality
|
||||||
|
has already changed
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
<td class="counter">
|
||||||
|
Management change, cost restructuring,
|
||||||
|
improving unit economics
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr>
|
||||||
|
<td>Complexity discount</td>
|
||||||
|
<td>
|
||||||
|
Analysts underweight what they cannot
|
||||||
|
easily model
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
<td class="counter">
|
||||||
|
Conglomerates, cross-sector businesses,
|
||||||
|
opaque but healthy cash flows
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr>
|
||||||
|
<td>Sentiment overshoot</td>
|
||||||
|
<td>
|
||||||
|
Fear or enthusiasm has moved price far
|
||||||
|
beyond the rational range
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
<td class="counter">
|
||||||
|
Implied assumptions that require
|
||||||
|
implausible outcomes to justify current price
|
||||||
|
</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
</tbody>
|
||||||
|
</table>
|
||||||
|
</div>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<h2>The Role of Implied Expectations</h2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
The most disciplined version of this approach is to work
|
||||||
|
backwards from price. Rather than building a model and
|
||||||
|
concluding that a stock is cheap or expensive, start by
|
||||||
|
asking: what does this price require? What growth rate, what
|
||||||
|
margin profile, what reinvestment assumption would you need
|
||||||
|
to believe to justify paying what the market is asking today?
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
If the answer requires a long run of performance with no
|
||||||
|
credible foundation in the company's history, competitive
|
||||||
|
position, or industry structure — the price is wrong in one
|
||||||
|
direction. If the assumptions are so pessimistic that even a
|
||||||
|
mediocre outcome would beat them, it is wrong in the other.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
This framing makes the investment case explicit and
|
||||||
|
falsifiable. It forces a specific disagreement with the
|
||||||
|
market rather than a vague sense that something is cheap or
|
||||||
|
expensive. And it clarifies what would need to be true for
|
||||||
|
the thesis to fail — which is at least as important as
|
||||||
|
knowing what would need to be true for it to succeed.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<h2>On Being Wrong in Public</h2>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
A genuinely contrarian position is, by definition, one that
|
||||||
|
the consensus thinks is mistaken. Holding it requires being
|
||||||
|
comfortable with the fact that most informed observers
|
||||||
|
currently disagree with you, and that some period of time
|
||||||
|
will pass before — if — the price reflects the view you hold.
|
||||||
|
That discomfort is not incidental to the strategy. It is the
|
||||||
|
mechanism by which the return is generated. If the position
|
||||||
|
were comfortable, it would be consensus, and it would already
|
||||||
|
be priced.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
This does not mean contrarianism for its own sake is sound.
|
||||||
|
Being different from the consensus is not the same as being
|
||||||
|
right. The goal is not to disagree with the market but to
|
||||||
|
identify specific, well-reasoned cases where the market's
|
||||||
|
current view is demonstrably wrong — and where the gap
|
||||||
|
between implied expectations and probable reality is large
|
||||||
|
enough to be worth the risk of being early, or simply
|
||||||
|
incorrect.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<hr />
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<p>
|
||||||
|
Value is not a style. It is a discipline applied wherever
|
||||||
|
the math supports it. The companies that look most like
|
||||||
|
"value stocks" by conventional screens are often the ones
|
||||||
|
where the opportunity has already been arbitraged away. The
|
||||||
|
real work is in finding the situations where the consensus
|
||||||
|
has constructed a story the underlying economics cannot
|
||||||
|
support — or has failed to construct one that they clearly
|
||||||
|
do. That gap, wherever it appears, is where returns come
|
||||||
|
from.
|
||||||
|
</p>
|
||||||
|
</article>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<footer>
|
||||||
|
<a href="mailto:contact@samantha42.xyz">contact@samantha42.xyz</a>
|
||||||
|
<p>© 2026 — All rights reserved</p>
|
||||||
|
</footer>
|
||||||
|
</div>
|
||||||
|
</body>
|
||||||
|
</html>
|
||||||
@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
<!DOCTYPE html>
|
|
||||||
<html lang="en">
|
|
||||||
<head>
|
|
||||||
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
|
|
||||||
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"/>
|
|
||||||
<title>Git — Samantha Friis</title>
|
|
||||||
<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=DM+Mono:wght@300;400;500&family=Syne:wght@400;700;800&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"/>
|
|
||||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css"/>
|
|
||||||
</head>
|
|
||||||
<body>
|
|
||||||
<div class="container">
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<header>
|
|
||||||
<a href="/" class="back">← back</a>
|
|
||||||
<p class="tag">// git</p>
|
|
||||||
<h1>Code &<br/><span>Repositories</span></h1>
|
|
||||||
<p class="header-sub">Personal projects · Private & public</p>
|
|
||||||
</header>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<main class="two-col">
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<!-- ── LEFT: Login / Private Dashboard ── -->
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="section-label">// private access</p>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<div class="login-panel" id="login-panel">
|
|
||||||
<h2>Sign In</h2>
|
|
||||||
<p class="desc">Access to private repositories and personal workspace. Requires credentials and 2FA.</p>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<div class="form-group">
|
|
||||||
<label for="username">Username</label>
|
|
||||||
<input type="text" id="username" placeholder="samantha" autocomplete="username" />
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<div class="form-group">
|
|
||||||
<label for="password">Password</label>
|
|
||||||
<input type="password" id="password" placeholder="••••••••••••" autocomplete="current-password" />
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<div class="twofa-group" id="twofa-group">
|
|
||||||
<label for="twofa">Authenticator Code</label>
|
|
||||||
<input type="text" id="twofa" placeholder="000 000" maxlength="7" autocomplete="one-time-code" />
|
|
||||||
<p class="twofa-hint">Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app.</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<button class="btn-login" id="login-btn" onclick="handleLogin()">Continue →</button>
|
|
||||||
<p class="login-error" id="login-error">Invalid credentials. Please try again.</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<!-- Private dashboard (shown after login) -->
|
|
||||||
<div id="private-dashboard">
|
|
||||||
<div class="repo-list">
|
|
||||||
<a href="#" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">samantha-site</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Personal website and Go backend server</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge private">private</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
<a href="#" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">equity-tools</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Python scripts for SEC filing analysis and financial modeling</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge active">active</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
<a href="#" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">infra-config</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Dotfiles, server configs, and deployment scripts</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge private">private</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
<a href="#" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">typst-templates</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Custom Typst document templates for reports and analysis</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge active">active</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<button class="logout-btn" onclick="handleLogout()">← sign out</button>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<!-- ── RIGHT: Public section ── -->
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<div class="repo-list">
|
|
||||||
<a href="/gitpage/TicTacToe" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">TicTacToe</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Python learning tic tac toe game in terminal</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge private">private</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
<a href="/gitpage/infra-config" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">infra-config</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Dotfiles, server configs, and deployment scripts</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge private">private</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
<a href="/gitpage/typst-templates" class="repo-item">
|
|
||||||
<div>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-name">typst-templates</p>
|
|
||||||
<p class="repo-desc">Custom Typst document templates for reports and analysis</p>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<span class="repo-badge active">active</span>
|
|
||||||
</a>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
<button class="logout-btn" onclick="handleLogout()">← sign out</button>
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
</main>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<footer>
|
|
||||||
<a href="mailto:contact@samantha42.xyz">contact@samantha42.xyz</a>
|
|
||||||
<p class="footer-copy">© 2026 — All rights reserved</p>
|
|
||||||
</footer>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
</div>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<script>
|
|
||||||
let step = 1;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
function handleLogin() {
|
|
||||||
const username = document.getElementById('username').value.trim();
|
|
||||||
const password = document.getElementById('password').value.trim();
|
|
||||||
const twofa = document.getElementById('twofa').value.trim();
|
|
||||||
const tfGroup = document.getElementById('twofa-group');
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('login-error').classList.remove('visible');
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (step === 1) {
|
|
||||||
if (!username || !password) { showError('Please enter your username and password.'); return; }
|
|
||||||
step = 2;
|
|
||||||
tfGroup.classList.add('visible');
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('login-btn').textContent = 'Verify →';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('twofa').focus();
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
if (!twofa || twofa.replace(/\s/g, '').length < 6) { showError('Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app.'); return; }
|
|
||||||
if (twofa.replace(/\s/g, '').match(/^\d{6}$/)) {
|
|
||||||
showDashboard();
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
showError('Invalid authenticator code.');
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
function showError(msg) {
|
|
||||||
const error = document.getElementById('login-error');
|
|
||||||
const panel = document.getElementById('login-panel');
|
|
||||||
error.textContent = msg;
|
|
||||||
error.classList.add('visible');
|
|
||||||
panel.classList.add('shake');
|
|
||||||
setTimeout(() => panel.classList.remove('shake'), 500);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
function showDashboard() {
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('login-panel').style.display = 'none';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('private-dashboard').classList.add('visible');
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
function handleLogout() {
|
|
||||||
step = 1;
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('login-panel').style.display = '';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('private-dashboard').classList.remove('visible');
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('username').value = '';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('password').value = '';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('twofa').value = '';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('twofa-group').classList.remove('visible');
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('login-btn').textContent = 'Continue →';
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('login-error').classList.remove('visible');
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
document.addEventListener('keydown', (e) => { if (e.key === 'Enter') handleLogin(); });
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
document.getElementById('twofa').addEventListener('input', (e) => {
|
|
||||||
let val = e.target.value.replace(/\D/g, '').slice(0, 6);
|
|
||||||
if (val.length > 3) val = val.slice(0, 3) + ' ' + val.slice(3);
|
|
||||||
e.target.value = val;
|
|
||||||
});
|
|
||||||
</script>
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
</body>
|
|
||||||
</html>
|
|
||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user